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Abstract
In the 1990s, Nigeria mobilised West African states to 
international peacekeeping missions in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone under the auspices of the ECOWAS Monitoring 
Group (ECOMOG). The initiative did not only become a 
model for other regional organisations across the globe, 
it also placed Nigeria in a more influential position in 
international conflict management, especially within 
Africa. But while the scheme helped Nigeria to score some 
marks in international conflict management, it, however, 
left significant impression on the nation’s foreign policy. 
It is on the above premise, therefore, that this article 
examines how and why Nigeria’s participation in conflict 
resolution within West Africa was influential to its foreign 
policy perception, goal and strategy between 1990 and 
2000. The study is approached through the historical 
inquiry. While the impact of the regional peacekeeping 
programme on Nigeria’s foreign policy is acknowledged, 
the paper, however, concludes that the emerging post-
Cold War international order and political leadership in 
Nigeria were the considerable factors, which presented the 
opportunities for such imprint to be registered.
Key words: Regional peacekeeping; Foreign policy; 
ECOMOG; National Interest; Nigeria
F a m o y e ,  A .  D .  ( 2 0 1 8 ) .  R e g i o n a l  P e a c e k e e p i n g  a n d  t h e 
Transformat ion of  Niger ian  Foreign Pol icy,  1990-2000:  A 




One of the interest ing events that  followed the 
establishment and operations of ECOMOG in the 1990s 
would be the academic attention it received. The fact 
that it was the first sub-regional peacekeeping effort 
and coming from an area that had hitherto substantially 
depended on international interventions for the resolution 
of its numerous armed conflicts, made ECOMOG to be 
keenly watched.  For example, there have been attempts to 
interrogate the rationale behind Nigeria’s leadership roles 
in the operations of the coalition, especially in Liberia. 
Also, there are efforts to understand the politics involved 
in the establishment of the regional peacekeeping force, 
as well as the relevance of the scheme to the present 
and future management of conflicts in the sub-region. 
For example, Ogbu (1994), ‘Nigeria and the Liberia 
Imbroglio: An Epitome of Nigerian-led Crisis Resolution 
in the Sub-Region’, examines the intervention of Nigeria 
in the Liberian crisis, with the aim of justifying the 
mission. The work sets out by analysing the views of the 
critics of the mission and the basis for their criticisms. 
Debunking the claims of the critics, which were described 
as ‘unfortunate observers’, the article provides a number 
of reasons as justifications for the intervention. It is 
argued, for instance, that the intervention was mainly on 
moral ground, which was a demonstration of Nigeria’s 
commitment to its principle of ‘Africa as the centre-
piece’ of its foreign policy. It is claimed also that the 
intervention was motivated by Nigeria’s desire to ensure 
regional security and end the humanitarian catastrophe in 
Liberia(Ogbu, 1994, pp.195-200).
Adeleke (1995), ‘The Politics and Diplomacy of 
Peacekeeping in West Africa: The ECOWAS Operation in 
Liberia’, traces the history of the Liberian civil war and 
also engages in a fascinating analysis of the diplomatic 
playoffs involving Nigeria and her West Africa rivals, 
such as Cote d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso, as they all 
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struggled for political influence in Liberia. The paper also 
investigates the specific interests of Nigeria, especially 
those of her political elite in the crisis and how all of these 
factors affected the performance of ECOMOG(Adeleke, 
1995, pp. 569-593). Similarly, in Chapter Four, Berman 
and Sams (2000), Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities 
and Culpabilities, discusses the changing status of 
ECOWAS as it transformed from performing purely 
socio-economic responsibilities to security maintenance 
within the sub-region. The work analyses the challenges 
encountered by the attempts to build security framework 
in the sub-region before the creation of ECOMOG. 
It also examines the politics of ECOWAS states and 
the implication for ECOMOG. It interrogates the UN 
and US approaches to ECOMOG missions in Liberia, 
Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau, and concludes with an 
evaluation of the prospects of ECOWAS(Berman & Sams, 
2000, pp. 95-105).
In 2002, Adebajo published two books, Liberia’s 
Civil War: Nigeria, ECOMOG, and Regional Security in 
West Africa and Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau. The former examines 
the intents, roles and contributions of Nigeria, other 
West African powers, Libya and important non-state 
actors such a Samuel Doe, Charles Taylor and Yormie 
Johnson, to the protracted Liberian Civil War(Adebajo, 
2000). The latter, however, assesses the relevance of the 
colonial experiences to the contemporary political and 
socio-economic development of West Africa countries. 
It also evaluates the causes, interests and roles of states 
and non-state actors in the crises in Liberia, Sierra Leone 
and Guinea-Bissau. It also analyses the challenges and 
prospects of ECOWAS in conflict resolution in the sub-
region(Adebajo, 2002).
Finally, Osakwe and Audu (2017), ‘The Nigeria Led 
ECOMOG Military Intervention and Interest in the Sierra 
Leone Crisis: An Overview’, is an interrogation of the 
rationale behind Nigeria’s decision to foil a military 
coup in Sierra Leone. This becomes intriguing mainly 
because Nigeria itself was at that moment under a military 
dictatorship headed by Sani Abacha. The article takes into 
account the criticisms that followed the intervention and 
how that affected the operation. With the real intention 
of Abacha’s government still largely unknown, it is 
guessed that the intervention was considerably provoked 
by Nigeria’s desire to outsmart her contemporary West 
African states by ‘scoring quick victory without’ without 
them(Osakwe & Audu, 2017, pp. 107-116).
An implication of the above research trend is that 
some other critical aspects of the subject-matter have 
not been given due academic attention. However, this 
article represents a shift from the usual as it attends to 
one of such less addressed but equally important issues 
relating to the subject-matter. Thus, the paper attempts 
to understand how and why the Nigerian involvement in 
regional peacekeeping influenced the country’s foreign 
policy perspective, goal and strategy for a decade 
following the establishment of ECOMOG. The period 
has been carefully chosen because, as narrated above, 
ECOMOG was established and launched its first operation 
in 1990. However, the establishment of the UN Mission 
in Liberia (UNMIL) in 1993 brought a major international 
assistance to ECOMOG and prepared the stage for the 
eventual takeover of the resolution exercise by the UN. 
Again in 1997, the regional force under the leadership of 
Nigeria commenced another mission in Sierra Leone and 
was solely in charge until 2000, when the UN took charge 
following the establishment of the UN Mission in Sierra 
Leon (UNAMSIL). This, therefore, ended in the sub-
region the tradition of unilateral peacekeeping operations 
of a Nigerian-led ECOMOG1. Thus, the article explored 
primary and secondary source materials, while the 
historical enquiry was used in interpreting the materials. 
1 .   AN OVERVIEW OF N IGERIA’S 
PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL 
PEACEKEEPING UP TO 1990
There is no doubt that Nigeria, prior to 1990, had made 
a mark in international conflict management through its 
participation in international peacekeeping operations. 
Starting from its maiden appearance in peacekeeping 
mission in Zaire (now Congo), Nigeria proceeded to 
participate in several other international missions. For 
instance, it was involved in the peace missions in India/
Pakistan (1960-1964), New Guinea (1962-1963), Lebanon 
(1975-1979), Chad (1978-1983), Angola (1989-1995) and 
Namibia (1989-1990)( Amao & Okeke-Uzodike, 2015, p. 
81).
However, in 1990, following the emergence of the 
Liberian crisis, ECOWAS states with the leadership of 
Nigeria were able to create a regional force, which was 
saddled with the responsibility of ending the crisis and 
bringing peace to the West African state. It should be 
emphasised that ECOMOG was unique for a number of 
reasons. First, as the first of its kind globally, the regional 
force had no experience or any related existing system 
to learn or copy from. Its sudden emergence seemed to 
have denied it the opportunity of proper pre-operation 
planning. This explains why most of its earlier strategies 
were based on trial and error. Second, as a new invention, 
the global community watched with kin interest what 
would be the fate of the force. This appeared to have 
partly put pressure on the initiators, especially Nigeria 
that was the most significant financier and coordinator of 
its operations. Third, the establishment of the force was 
shrouded in diplomatic controversies involving ECOWAS 
members. For instance, while there were divisions along 
1 Daily Champion. (2007, May 20) ‘Between ECOMOG AND 
UNAMSIL: A Score Card’, p. 6.
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the old pattern of Anglo-Francophone supremacy struggle, 
there was also dissatisfaction among the Anglophone 
members. The former had largely hindered the support 
and participation of the Francophone nations, which saw 
Nigeria and other Anglophone states as outsmarting them, 
in the operation. The latter was dissatisfaction among 
Anglophone members chiefly on Nigeria’s domination 
and rigidity in the control of the affairs of the supposedly 
coalition force. With this development and no significant 
assistance from the international community, the financial 
and logistic responsibilities of the force, therefore, fell 
almost entirely on Nigeria. And with the international 
image of Nigeria at stake, it became highly committed to 
the survival and success of ECOMOG.
2.  REGIONAL PEACEKEEPING AND THE 
IMPLICATION FOR NIGERIA’S FOREIGN 
POLICY, 1990-2000
As established above, Nigeria had long been involved in 
international peacekeeping before 1990. However, none 
of the missions qualified as regional peacekeeping. What 
seemed close to regional peacekeeping was the bilateral 
peace operation between Nigeria and Chad. And of 
course, this was exclusively an agreement between two 
friendly states, which cannot in anyway be classified as a 
regional effort. In fact, up to 1990, regional peacekeeping 
did not appear as an objective or a method of attaining 
other foreign policy objectives of Nigeria. But, after 
the introduction of ECOMOG, Nigeria successfully 
established regional peacekeeping as a cardinal 
programme of its foreign policy. For instance, between 
1990 and 1993, when Babangida left office, Nigeria was 
firmly in charge of the regional force and its operation 
in Liberia. Even when the mission was telling on the 
nation’s economy, Babangida constantly justified and 
reiterated Nigeria’s committed to its success2. And after 
he had inherited the peacekeeping mission in Liberia from 
its predecessors, Abacha’s government continued with it 
and even initiated another peacekeeping mission in Sierra 
Leone in 19973. And despite the huge human, material 
and financial burdens imposed on Nigeria, it still went 
ahead with the missions4. The subsequent administrations, 
especially Abubakar and Obasanjo, were also indifferent 
as they sustained the tradition of their predecessors.
It is, however, important to note that the existing 
political order in Nigeria encouraged the unflinching 
support for regional peacekeeping. For instance, for 
most part of the decade, Nigeria was under military 
2 New Nigeria. (1992, October 30) ‘ECOMOG Operations in 
Liberia: IBB Says no Going Back’, , p. 1; National Concord. (1990, 
November 5) ‘Why Nigeria Went into Liberia’, p.12.
3 This Day. (1998, February 15); The Sunday Newspaper. (1998, 
February 15) ‘ECOMG Resolves the S’ Leone Debacle’, p. 5.
4 The Nation. (2011, July, 26).
dictators, who were grossly unaccountable to the citizens 
on their actions and inactions.  As such, it was possible 
for them to expend the nation’s resources at will without 
consequences. This form of approach by the Nigerian 
leaders partly accounted for why their efforts at resolving 
those crises were alleged to have been more driven by 
personal interests. Babangida, for example, was accused 
of leading ECOMOG to Liberia mainly because of 
his financial investment in the country and personal 
relationship with Samuel Doe5. Similarly, Abacha was 
accused of having no justification, except personal 
reasons, for the intervention in Sierra Leone. The claim 
seemed to be right especially because aside the fact that 
Abacha was a despot, who came to power through a coup, 
he also had successfully carved a niche for himself in 
coup plotting in Nigeria even before this time6.
Thus, in order to properly align with the newly self-
imposed responsibility, some adjustments were made to 
the operations of some national agencies, especially those 
that were directly involved in the nation’s foreign policy 
or the regional peacekeeping scheme. These included 
the armed forces, police, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA). 
For example, as soon as ECOMOG was established, 
the Nigerian Armed Forces and the police began to give 
special training to their personnel since they formed the 
bulk of ECOMOG military and paramilitary personnel. 
More importantly, since international assistance was 
not forthcoming as expected, leadership in terms of 
experience and training of ECOMOG personnel fell on the 
Nigerian military and police. It is also a matter of interest 
that the National War College was established in 19927. 
Although, as the highest military training institution, the 
main objective of the college was to enhance the skills 
of officers in their task of defending the nation, a great 
number of researched publications from the institute 
were studies focusing on the place of Nigeria in crisis 
management in West African and Africa at large. This, 
therefore, appeared more as a deliberate effort to properly 
document the history, challenges and prospect of Nigeria’s 
approach to crisis management in the sub-region.
On i ts  own,  the Minis t ry  of  Foreign Affairs 
continuously facilitated the meetings of ECOWAS foreign 
affairs ministers to assess the on-going armed conflicts 
in the sub-region and brainstorm on the success of 
ECOMOG. For example, in the first half of the decade, 
there were Nigerian facilitated meetings of foreign affairs 
ministers of ECOMOG members to discuss Liberia crisis 
and assess the performance of the regional force. During 
5 This Day. (1995, March 31), pp. 1-2; Daily Times, (1996, April, 
30), p. 6.
6  African Success. (2007, November, 20).
7 Tell, ‘A College of War: Babangida Opens the School for top 
Military Brass, Pleading with the Army not to Rock the Transition 
Boat’, June 29, 1992, p. 26.
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the October 1998 and December 1999 conferences, 
ECOMOG Force Commander was invited to provide 
updates on Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau 
missions(ECOWAS, 1990; ECOWAS, 1998; ECOWAS, 
1999). While it would appear that the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs was only carrying out its duty of justifying the 
government’s foreign policy action, the memoranda 
from these meetings were expected to help ECOMOG. 
Furthermore, aside the fact that it provided the necessary 
opportunities, in forms of conferences and workshops, 
for specialists in the fields of security and international 
relations to exchange views on the sub-region’s peace-
building efforts, NIIA’s two publications, the Nigerian 
Journal of International Affairs and Nigerian Forum, 
turned out several articles on the same subject-matter 
during the period (The West African Bulletin, 1995; 
Moyosore, 1990, pp. 33-40; Browne, 1995, pp. 100-101). 
In fact, NIIA at a point attracted international grant from 
the Ford Foundation to study ECOMOG operations8. A 
major assumption that can be made from the above is that, 
there seemed to be a synergy among the aforementioned 
nat ional  agencies on research,  formulat ion and 
implementation of policies that would ensure successful 
outing of Nigeria’s baby (ECOMOG).
Recall that right from independence, Nigeria had 
always argued that Africa was the centrepiece of its 
foreign policy. This implied that the nation’s foreign 
policy would fundamentally be based and guided by the 
issues affecting the continent (Africa), as a whole (Ogbu, 
1994, p.198). The concern here is that the span of the 
principle, prior to 1990, seemed to have captured the 
whole of Africa without preference for any part of the 
continent. This concept of Africanism was vigorously 
demonstrated in the campaigns for decolonisation, 
eradication of apartheid policy and later on economic 
integrated of African states. In fact, at some points in the 
history of its foreign policy, Nigeria’s belief and passion 
for the principle had brought her into frictions with some 
of her most valued Western allies. One can still recollect 
the cases of the nationalisation of Shell BP (Nig) Ltd and 
the Barclays Bank in 1979. Shell BP was nationalised for 
flouting Nigeria’s orders not to sell oil to South Africa, 
while Barclays Bank was nationalised for disregarding 
Nigeria’s directive not to buy South African government’s 
bonds9. However, with emerging protracted civil wars and 
their increasing security threats to Nigeria and the entire 
sub-region, the country was compelled to prioritise West 
African issues, although not necessarily at the expense 
of other sub-regions. While Nigeria still proclaimed the 
principle, it was, however, obvious that the real centre 
peace of Nigeria’s foreign policy was West Africa. In 
other words, Nigeria was more drawn to the socio-
8 National Concord (1990, December), ‘NIIA to Study ECOMOG 
Operations: Courtesy Ford Foundation’, p. 19.
9 News Watch Magazine. (2010, October 27).
political matters within the sub-region than elsewhere in 
the continent. This consequently marked a shift from the 
old order, where the concern was swiftly for the whole 
of the continent. It also, for example, partly explains 
why the resolution of the crises in Angola, Rwanda and 
Mozambique in the same decade, did not receive as much 
attention as West African crises did receive from Nigeria. 
In fact, an assessment of Nigeria’s external financial 
obligations during the period has clearly shown that most 
of its spending was on ECOMOG10.
As a major player in West African politics, regional 
hegemony had always been a major goal of Nigerian 
foreign policy right from independence. And arguably, 
this was well attained more than any other national 
interests sought within the sub-region during the period 
under review. In fact, no member of ECOWAS exercised 
as much influence as Nigeria in the political and 
socio-economic affairs of the sub-region(Adisa, 1979, 
p.164). But prior to 1990, Nigeria’s attempts toward 
the attainment and sustenance of this goal had been 
considerably limited to economic approaches. On several 
occasions, such economic methods had included but 
not limited to oil concession, financial and material aid, 
grants and even economic sanctions (Aluko, 1976, pp. 
425-431). For example, the formations and the leadership 
roles of Nigeria in the Lake Chad Basin Commission in 
1964, the River Niger Commission (later renamed Niger 
Basin Authority) in 1964 and the Economic Community 
of West African States were strategies that made Nigeria 
highly influential in the sub-region. However, with 
the establishment of ECOMOG, Nigeria successfully 
employed regional peacekeeping as a method of pursuing 
its hegemony in West Africa.
It should be emphasised that this newly found 
approach did go a long way in giving Nigeria diplomatic 
leverage over West African political affairs, especially 
the security related aspect of it. Recall, for instance, that 
the UN and major world powers had initially refused to 
intervene in the Liberia crisis. Even the United States, 
regardless of the existing historical connections with 
Liberia, refused to intervene in the crisis11. This, however, 
was largely not unconnected with emerging international 
order. Among other factors, the decline of the Cold War 
tension and the emergence of international liberalism at 
the close of the 1980s had reduced the position of strategic 
importance, which Africa had hitherto enjoyed, especially 
at the peak of the war. The subsequent reduction in 
economic and military assistance from the global powers 
10 This Day. (1997, August 3) ‘Nigeria Spends N255bn on 
ECOMOG: Abacha Calls for Sanctions on Sierra Leone’, p. 
1; Tribune. (1990, May 1) ‘Nigeria Spends N328.5 Billion on 
ECOMOG’.
11 New Nigeria, 1997, June 21; Berman, E.G. and Sams, K.E. 
(2000), Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities 
(United Nations), pp. 95-105; Franke, B., Security Cooperation in 
Africa..., p. 102-105.
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to African states was a signal of the new position of Africa 
in international politics. More importantly, Africa would 
no longer enjoy automatic international intervention in its 
armed conflicts (Mortimer, 1996, pp. 293-306; Franke, 
2001, pp.102-105; Whiteman & Yates, 2004, pp.360-361). 
Consequently, the responsibility of resolving African 
crises would fall almost completely on Africa itself.
When the US finally decided to interfere, it even 
chose not to relate directly with Nigerian-led ECOMOG, 
especially since allegations of prejudice had been levelled 
against Nigeria by the National Patriotic Front of Liberia 
(NPFL). As a way of assuring all the contesting blocs of 
fair play, the US, therefore, encouraged Senegal that had 
hitherto stayed out of the ECOMOG mission, for some 
personal reservations, to now intervene. The US provided 
Senegal with financial and logistic supports. However, it 
soon turned out that the crisis was more complex than the 
US and Senegal had envisaged, leading to the withdrawal 
of Senegalese soldiers. So, when the Senegalese approach 
failed, the UN, US and the international community had 
no alternative but to relate directly now with Nigeria on 
how to resolve the crisis12. Subsequently, Abuja became 
a major decision-maker as well as converging point for 
diplomatic and strategic discourses of West Africa security 
and political development.
CONCLUSION
This paper has examined the Nigeria’s involvement in 
regional peacekeeping operations in West Africa and 
how this had influenced its foreign policy in the last 
decade of the twentieth century. It is observed that the 
nation’s foreign policy view, goals and mechanism for 
the attainment of such objectives were considerably 
influenced by the country’s leadership roles in the 
ECOMOG venture. Nonetheless, the emerging post-
Cold War international order that offered Nigeria the 
opportunities to provide the leadership required for 
the resolution of the region’s armed conflicts and the 
favourable disposure of its (Nigeria) political leaders 
towards the scheme were major reasons why such 
impressions were registered on the nation’s foreign policy.
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